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The California Initiative Process: The
Demise of the Single-Subject Rule
In California, the initiative is an electoral process that allows citizens
to enact laws by presenting proposed legislation directly to the voters.'
Since this lawmaking process bypasses the legislature, the initiative is
considered a "direct" form of government.2 California, however, cur-
rently limits initiative proposals to one subject.3 This limitation is com-
monly referred to as the single-subject rule.4 In general, the purpose of
the rule is to prevent multisubject initiatives that might confuse voters
and subvert the actual will of the people.5
Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court has applied the rule in
a way that frustrates the purpose of the rule. In particular, the court
has construed the rule so liberally that a "single subject" now means a
"general objective." 6 The danger of this liberal interpretation is that
the court allows broad and confusing initiatives to be presented to the
voters. Consequently, if a majority of the voters do not understand a
complex initiative or do not favor all parts of the initiative, the true
intent of the voters may not be effectuated.
To understand why the court has continued to apply a broad inter-
pretation of the single-subject rule to initiative proposals, this comment
will examine the purpose and history behind the rule. Specifically, this
comment will show that the court developed the liberal interpretation
of the rule in earlier cases in which the rule was applied to legislative
acts.7 After initiatives were also subjected to the single-subject rule, the
court imposed the same liberal interpretation of the rule on the initia-
tives. This liberal interpretation of the rule is still applied by the court
1. See Note, The California Initiative Process: .4 Suggestionfor Reform, 48 S. CAL. L. REv.
922, 922 (1975). See generally CAL. CONST. art. II, §8; CAL. ELEC. CODE §§3500-3579.
2. See Note, supra note I at 922.
3. See CAL. CONST. art. II, §8(d). The California Constitution, like most state constitutions,
includes the limitation that legislative bills contain only one subject. Besides limiting statutes
enacted by the Legislature to one subject, the California Constitution also restricts initiatives to a
single subject. The rule is equally applied to both processes and is intended to accomplish similar
p urposes. Ruud, "No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject," 42 MINN. L. REv. 389, 389
1958).
4. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 245, 651 P.2d 274, 279, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 35
(1982).
5. See Cal. Voter Pamphlet, General Election, Nov. 1948, at 8-9. (Copy on file at the Pacifc
Law Journal).
6. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d at 245, 651 P.2d at 279, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
7. See Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87, 92, 207 P.2d 47, 49-50 (1949).
1095
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 14
to legislative acts and initiatives. In order for the court to continue to
apply the same interpretation of the rule to both the legislative and the
initiative process, the two processes should be substantially the same.
As this comment will point out, however, the lack of proposal review
and the lack of voter understanding in the initiative process clearly dis-
tinguishes it from the legislative process. These distinctions, combined
with the refusal of the court to review judicial challenges under the rule
prior to elections, increase the likelihood that initiatives not favored by
the majority of the voters will become law. Because of this possibility,
the court should adopt a stricter interpretation of the single-subject rule
where initiatives are concerned to prevent those proposals from ever
being presented to the electorate.
It is beyond the scope of this comment to solve all of the problems of
the initiative process that result in a lack of proposal review and voter
misunderstanding. Rather, the specific purpose of this comment is to
advocate a change in the standard of review for initiatives challenged
under the single-subject rule. To enable a better understanding of why
a new standard is necessary, the purposes behind the single-subject rule
must first be considered in detail.
THE PURPOSES AND HISTORY OF THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE
IN CALIFORNIA
A. The Purposes of the Single-Subject Rule
A primary purpose of the single-subject rule as applied to legislative
acts is to prevent legislative abuses by "logrolling" and the use of "rid-
ers."' "Logrolling" is the practice in which several legislators combine
their unrelated proposals into one bill.9 This practice permits the bill to
be passed by consolidating the votes of the separate factions.'l The evil
of "logrolling" manifests itself in situations where no single proposal of
any minority could have obtained majority approval separately." A
"rider" is a variation of logrolling in which a bill that is certain to pass
contains a proposal of lesser popularity. 2 Since the bill is certain to
pass, the less popular proposal "rides" along on the merits of the more
popular proposals in the bill. The same evil perceived to exist in log-
rolling is present with riders since the rider would not have passed
standing alone. 3 Riders also create the additional danger of circum-
8. Ruud, supra note 3 at 391; see also Note, Constitutional Law-Appropriation Bills and the
Kansas One-Subject Rule--State ex re. Stephan v. Carlin, 30 U. KAN. L. REv. 625, 625 (1982).
9. Ruud, supra note 3, at 391.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 413; Note, supra note 8 at 625.
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venting an important legislative check-the gubernatorial veto. 4 A
governor may consider an entire bill to be so important that he will
approve the bill even though the rider proposal is abhorrent to him. 5
Another purpose of the single-subject rule is to provide orderly legis-
lative procedures.' 6 By limiting a bill to one subject, the bill may be
less complex and, therefore, more easily understood by legislators.' 7
Moreover, the limitation to one subject may help prevent the introduc-
tion of extraneous matters not germane to the bill.'8 The concerns over
the misunderstanding of the proposed law and the inclusion of extrane-
ous material in legislation also exist in initiative proposals.' 9 In re-
sponse to these concerns, the Legislature required the application of the
single-subject rule to initiatives in 1948.20
Specifically, the Legislature recognized that a multisubject initiative
might impede the ability of the electorate to understand the true import
of a measure.2' This lack of understanding would thereby allow the
adoption of an initiative by the voters without their realizing the effect
of some of the less-publicized sections of the measure. The Legislature
further feared that an initiative might pass because minorities advocat-
ing some parts of the initiative proposal would pool their votes, giving
the proposal a false majority.22 This fear was aptly expressed in McFad-
den v. Jordan23 in which the California Supreme Court invalidated an
initiative proposal on the ground that the proposal revised the Consti-
14. Note, supra note 8, at 625-26.
15. Id.
16. Ruud, supra note 3, at 391.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Voter Pamphlet, supra note 5, at 8.
20. Voter Pamphlet, supra note 5, at 8-9. The 1948 voter pamphlet stated the purpose of the
single-subject rule as:
Today, any proposition may be submitted to the voters by initiative and it may contain
any number of subjects. By this device a proposition may contain 20 good features, but
have one bad one secreted among the 20 good ones. The busy voter does not have the
time to devote to the study of long, wordy, propositions and must rely upon such sketchy
information as may be received through the press, radio or picked up in general conver-
sation. If improper emphasis is placed upon one feature and the remaining features
ignored, or if there is a failure to study the entire proposed amendment, the voter may be
misled as to the over-all effect of the proposed amendment.
Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 2 entirely eliminates the possibility of such
confusion inasmuch as it will limit each proposed amendment to one subject and one
subject only.
Protection is also given to those individuals who sign the sponsoring petition. People
requested to sign the sponsoring petition will readily understand just what the entire
proposition is and not be confused or misled by a maze of unrelated matters some of
which are inadequately explained, purposely distorted, or intentionally concealed.
See generall Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 267, 651 P.2d 274, 293, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 49
(1982).
21. See Voters Pamphlet, supra note 5, at 8-9.
22. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 268, 651 P.2d at 293, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
23. 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948).
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tution, rather than amending it.24 The court stressed that proposals
containing "multifarious" provisions prevented voters from expressing
separate approval or disapproval of each major part of the proposal.2
Thus, the single-subject rule seeks to prevent multisubject proposals
that might mislead legislators and voters and prevent them from under-
standing the true meaning of the proposed legislation.2 6 The rule also
was instituted to prevent the pooling of minority interests to obtain pas-
sage of unfavorable legislation." Specifically, the rule was adopted to
prevent these dangers by invalidating an initiative measure or a pro-
posed piece of legislation that contains more than one subject,28 but
throughout the evolution of the rule in the courts, the rule as applied to
initiatives has failed to accomplish its intended purposes.
B. Evolution of the Single-Subject Rule in California
Prior to 1948, the single-subject rule was applied only to acts passed
in the Legislature.29 After the Legislature subjected initiative measures
to the same single-subject requirement as legislative acts, the California
Supreme Court was faced with applying the identical rule to a different
law-making process. The court, therefore, drew upon the philosophy
and standard it had established in applying the single-subject rule to
acts passed in the Legislature. °
Specifically, the court prior to 1948 had established the philosophy
that the single-subject rule was to be liberally construed."' According
to the court, a liberal construction was appropriate because the single-
subject rule was not intended to destroy legitimate legislation.3 2 Based
upon this liberal construction of the rule, the court established the "rea-
sonably germane" standard to determine whether or not a statute con-
tained more than one subject.33 The court held in Evans v. Superior
Court34 that all provisions of an act which are "reasonably germane" to
24. See id. at 349-50, 196 P.2d at 799.
25. Id. at 346, 196 P.2d at 797.
26. See Voter's Pamphlet, supra note 5, at 8-9.
27. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 268, 651 P.2d at 293, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
28. See CAL. CONST. art. II, §8(d).
29. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 265, 651 P.2d at 292, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
30. See Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87, 92, 207 P.2d 47, 49-50 (1949).
31. See People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624, 635 (1881). This philosophy has been consistently
followed in all later challenges under the rule to legislative acts. See Metropolitan Water District,
v. Marquardt, 59 Cal. 2d 159, 172-73, 379 P.2d 28, 34, 28 Cal. Rptr. 724, 730 (1963) ("Section 24 of
article IV must be construed liberally. . ."); Evans v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 58, 62, 8 P.2d 467,
469 (1932) ("[W]e are of the view that the provision is not to receive a narrow or technical con-
struction in all cases, but is to be construed liberally to uphold proper legislation. ... ) (quoting
from Heron v. Riley, 209 Cal. 507, 510, 289 P. 160, 161 (1930) and McClure v. Riley, 198 Cal. 23,
26, 243 P. 429, 430 (1926)).
32. See Heron v. Riley, 209 Cal. 507, 510, 289 P. 160, 161 (1930).
33. See id.
34. 215 Cal. 58, 8 P.2d 467 (1932).
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the purpose of the act, or have one general object, may be united in one
bill. 35 When initiatives were subsequently challenged under the single-
subject rule, the court continued to use the same "reasonably germane"
standard for both initiatives and legislation challenged under the rule.
The first initiative challenged under the single-subject rule sought to
repeal an earlier initiative that provided aid to the needy, aged and
blind.36 Although the initiative contained numerous provisions dealing
with pension payments, the court, in Perry v. Jordan ,3 upheld the initi-
ative using the "reasonably germane" standard.38 Specifically, the
court found that the provisions of the act had one general object and
therefore did not violate the single-subject rule.39
In the two most recent challenges to initiatives under the rule, the
court continued to give a liberal construction to the single-subject
rule.4" For example, in Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior
Court4 (hereinafter referred to as FPPC) the court upheld the chal-
lenged initiative under the "reasonably germane" standard by finding
that all of the provisions of the initiative had one general object.4 2 The
initiative in question was the 1974 Political Reform Act which con-
tained over twenty thousand words that regulated elections to public
office, conflicts of interests of public officials and lobbyists in the Legis-
lature.43 Arguably, the initiative did not deal with just a single-subject,
but rather with a general policy objective-that of preventing corrup-
tion in political campaigns.' By upholding this broad statute, the
court expanded the single-subject rule to new limits.
The other recent initiative to be challenged under the rule was the
Proposition 8 initiative, popularly known as the "Victims Bill of
Rights. 45 Proposition 8 dealt with a variety of subjects unrelated to
the rights of crime victims. For example, Proposition 8 changed the
right to bail and the use of prior convictions for sentence enhance-
35. See id. at 62-63, 8 P.2d at 469.
36. See Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87, 89, 207 P.2d 47, 48 (1949). The court faced an unusual
problem in this case because the initiative being challenged under the single-subject rule was a
repeal initiative. If the court struck down the repeal initiative on the basis of violating the rule,
then it impliedly held that the measure sought to be repealed also violated the rule. The court,
therefore, had to consider whether the measure sought to be repealed violated the single-subject
rule. Id. at 92, 207 P.2d at 49.
37. 34 Cal. 2d 87, 207 P.2d 47 (1949).
38. See id. at 93, 207 P.2d at 50.
39. See id.
40. See Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30; Fair Political Practices
Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 599 P.2d 46, 157 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1979).
41. 25 Cal. 3d 33, 599 P.2d 46, 157 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1979).
42. See id.
43. See CAL. GoVT. CODE §§81000-91013.
44. See Fair PoliticalPractices Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d at 54-57, 599 P.2d at 62-64, 157 Cal. Rptr.
at 871-73.
45. See Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30.
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ment.4 6 Moreover, Proposition 8 stated that students and staff of public
schools have "the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe,
secure and peaceful."47 The court, in Brosnahan v. Brown,4" held that
each of the provisions of the initiative bore a general object or general
subject that promoted the rights of actual or potential victims. 49 In ac-
cordance with FPPC, the court applied the "reasonably germane" stan-
dard to find that the rights of crime victims constituted a single subject.
Therefore, under the "reasonably germane" standard the court has not
clearly defined how broadly an initiative may be drawn.
After Brosnahan and FPPC the court has established the trend of
upholding an initiative whenever possible by giving a liberal construc-
tion to the rule." Consistent with this trend is the general refusal of the
court to judicially review initiative proposals challenged under the rule
until after the election.5 The court, however, will review the challenge
prior to the election if there is a clear showing of invalidity. 2
The court has given two reasons for this judicial restraint and liberal
construction of the rule. One reason is the competing interests between
the initiative process and the interests of the rule. On the side of the
initiative is the interest of preserving the right of the people to enact
legislation through the electoral process. 3 Conversely, the single-sub-
ject rule seeks to prevent the dangers of voter misunderstanding and
false majorities that may result in subverting the true intent of the elec-
torate. 4 With these competing interests in mind, the court in the past
has placed more weight on the interest of the initiative process.55
The other reason for the judicial restraint and the broad construction
of the rule is the initial interpretation given by the court to the rule. In
particular, prior to the application of the single-subject rule to initia-
tives, the court had determined that the rule was not intended to strike
down legitimate legislation and therefore should be liberally con-
strued. 6 This implied that statutes passed in the Legislature were pre-
sumed not to have violated the constitutional single subject limitation.
Once the single-subject rule became applicable to initiatives, the court
also presumed that initiatives were constitutionally valid under the sin-
46. See Cal. Voter Pamphlet, June 1982, Primary Election, at 32-35, 54-56.
47. Id. at 33.
48. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
49. Id. at 247, 651 P.2d at 280, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
50. Id. at 246, 651 P.2d at 279-80, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36.
51. See Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 4, 641 P.2d 200, 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 101 (1982).
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See Voters' Pamphlet, supra note 5, at 8-9.
55. See Fair Political Practices Commn, 25 Cal. 3d at 42, 599 P.2d at 51, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 860
(1979).
56. See Heron v. Riley, 209 Cal. 507, 510, 289 P. 160, 161 (1930).
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gle-subject rule unless the initiative clearly conflicted with the rule.57
Since the "reasonably germane" standard is the progeny of the lib-
eral interpretation of the rule, which applied to both legislation and
initiatives, the "reasonably germane" standard has been applied to
both as well. Logically, the same "reasonably germane" standard of
review for statutes should be applied to two different law-making
processes only if both processes are substantially the same. The two
proceses here in question, the initiative and the legislative, are not the
same. In fact, the vast differences between the two compel a change in
the current application of the single-subject rule to initiatives.
THE UNSUITABILITY OF THE "REASONABLY GERMANE" STANDARD
The initiative process differs from the legislative process in two ways.
Specifically, this section will demonstrate that the initiative process suf-
fers from a lack of proposal review and voter misunderstanding. These
two characteristics will be shown to increase the likelihood of multifari-
ous proposals. In addition to the differences between the initiative pro-
cess and the legislative process, a brief discussion will show how the
refusal of the court to review challenges to proposed initiatives under
the single-subject rule prior to elections increases the possibility of mul-
tifarious legislation. This judicial restraint along with the characteris-
tics of the initiative process will lead to the conclusion that the
"reasonably germane" standard of review-is inappropriate when apply-
ing the single-subject rule to initiatives.
A. The legislative v. the initiative process
A major concern with the passage of legislation in a democratic sys-
tem is the preservation of the will of the majority.58 In California both
the legislative process and the initiative process contain certain proce-
dures to ensure the enactment of legislation beneficial to the majority,
of the people.5 9 In particular, the statutory procedures required for
placing an initiative on the ballot are intended to ensure that the voters
only consider beneficial and meritorious initiative proposals. The initi-
ative procedures, however, often fail to meet this goal. This failure re-
sults from a lack of proposal review and voter misunderstanding. The
combination of these two characteristics increase the opportunity for
presentation to the voters of multisubject legislation that may violate
57. See Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d at 38, 599 P.2d at 48, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
857; Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87, 92, 207 P.2d 47, 50 (1949).
58. See Ruud, supra note 3, at 391.
59. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§3500-3579; J. BEEK, THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE at 36-56
(1974).
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the single-subject rule. Before examining the effects of voter misunder-
standing on the initiative process, the impact of lack of proposal review
on the initiative process must be understood.
L Lack ofproposal review
Review of proposed legislation by proponents as well as opponents is
essential to the democratic process. The review of proposed legislation
encourages debate between supporters and opponents that may inform
voters about the proposal and may encourage proponents to amend the
proposal to conform with the desires of the voters. An example of this
type of proposal review is found in the Legislature.
In the Legislature a bill is subject to multiple review and amend-
ment. Upon the introduction into the Assembly or Senate, a bill must
wait thirty days before reaching legislative consideration.6" This delay
allows interested parties time to acquaint themselves with the proposed
legislation.6' Following this waiting period, one of the standing com-
mittees hears arguments both opposing and supporting the bill in the
presence of the author.62 In addition to this waiting period, a bill is
also subject to amendments by the author or by the entire house, upon
the recommendation of the committee, while the bill is before the com-
mittee.63 Moreover, a bill may be amended when it goes to the floor of
the house.64 Finally, after review and passage of the bill in the house of
origin, each bill is sent to the other house for a repeat of the same
procedure.65 Once the bill passes in both houses, the governor receives
it for his signature.66 The governor may then sign the bill into law or
he may veto the bill.67
In contrast with the legislative process the initiative process does not
provide for review of initiative proposals. To place an initiative on the
ballot, the proponents of the measure must first draft a proposal and
submit it to the Attorney General with a written request for a title and
summary of the measure.68 When the Attorney General returns the
proposal, the proponents are required to obtain a designated number of
signatures in support of the proposal based upon a percentage of quali-
60. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, §8(a); BEEK, supra note 59, at 37.
61. See BEEK, supra note 59, at 37.
62. See id. at 38.
63. Id. at 43.
64. Id. at 47-51.
65. Id. at 52.
66. Id. at 52.
67. Id. at 54.
68. See CAL. CONST. art. II, §10(d); CAL. ELEC. CODE §3502. At this time, proponents are
required to pay a fee of $200 which is later refunded if the proposed initiative qualifies for the
ballot. Id. §3503. See generally CAL. GOVT. CODE § 10243.
1102
1983 / Single-Subject Rule
fled voters.69 The review by the Attorney General and the requirement
of gathering signatures are intended to screen the proposal prior to the
election; however, these procedures, when compared with those of the
legislative process, inadequately protect the initiative process from
multifarious initiatives.
Specifically, the review of a proposed initiative by the Attorney Gen-
eral does not provide for any revision of the measure.70 Moreover, in
contrast to the amending process in the Legislature, an initiative propo-
sal cannot be amended by the Attorney General.7 In fact, there is no
procedure open to opponents to amend the proposal prior to the elec-
tion.72 A proposal, therefore, may reach the ballot with no real oppor-
tunity for public debate or feedback.73 This lack of opportunity to
amend the initiative places a large burden on anyone who opposes it
because their only available remedies are judicial relief or the passage
of a subsequent initiative to repeal the disfavored one." Thus, "the
only expression left to all other interested parties who are not propo-
nents is the 'yes' or 'no' vote they cast."75
The initiative process, therefore, denies voters a fair choice of legisla-
tive options. Furthermore, the initiative process discourages propo-
nents from amending proposals in a way that might benefit the voters.
The lack of review coupled with this failure to encourage needed
amendments has resulted in complex initiatives which may be misun-
derstood by the voters.
2. Poor voter understanding
The amount of review each bill undergoes in the Legislature serves
to inform legislators so that they can vote intelligently on a bill. In
addition, legislators readily may seek information from other parties
such as the Legislative Counsel or staff members.76 The initiative pro-
69. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §3524. In order to qualify a proposed amendment to the constitu-
tion, proponents must obtain signatures totaling at least eight percent of the votes cast in the
preceding gubernatorial election. To qualify a proposed statutory change, the signatures of regis-
tered voters equalling five percent of the votes cast in the previous election must be gathered. Id.
Each signer must personally write his or her name as registered and supply his or her address. Id.
§3516. The persons actually circulating the petitions are required to affirm to that person's qualifi-
cations as a solicitor and that all of the signatures were obtained in the solicitor's presence. Id.
§§44, 3519. Afterproponents file their petitions with the county clerk or registrar of voters, the
clerk or registrar determines the total number of signatures on the petitions submitted in that
county and reports the total to the Secretary of State. Id. §3520.
70. See Note, supra note I, at 930.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 930-34.
73. Id. at 93 1.
74. Id.
75. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d at 266, 651 P.2d 292, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
76. See BEEK, supra note 59, at 32-33.
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cess, however, affords voters only a limited opportunity to understand
the proposed legislation. Ideally, the signature requirement mentioned
above 77 ensures that voters evaluate only meritorious proposals and
that voters understand the proposal when they sign the petition.7  In
addition, a summary of the proposal written by the Attorney General
along with arguments from the supporters and opponents of the meas-
ure must appear in the voters' pamphlet.79 In theory, these require-
ments provide adequate information to the voters; however, in practice
these requirements impart little understanding.
One reason for poor voter understanding is the seriously flawed sig-
nature gathering process that permits easy circumvention of the statu-
tory requirements . 0  Illegal devices that have been used to obtain
signatures include the following: forgery of signatures; illegal employ-
ment of children as signature gatherers; misleading summaries in cam-
paign literature; and "dodger cards"-cards that cover up the Attorney
General's official summary on the petition with one more favorable to
the pr6ponents.8' As a result of these devices, voter misunderstanding
of proposals still occurs in spite of the statutory procedures.8 2 A voter
may be confused over a proposal due to any of the following reasons:
(1) the subject matter of the initiative may be so complex that special
knowledge is required to understand the proposal; (2) the initiative
may be so long that it becomes very difficult for a voter to properly
understand the proposal; 3 (3) the subject matter may be obscured by a
proponent's simplistic explanation; (4) the voter's education level may
prevent him from understanding the initiative; or (5) the voter may be
misled by advertising campaigns and slogans.8 4 Another reason for
77. To qualify an initiative for the ballot proponents are required to obtain a statutorily
required number of signatures. CAL. CONST. art. II, §8(b).
78. See Note, supra note 1, at 924.
79. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§3559-3567; Note, supra note I, at 924.
80. See Note, supra note 1, at 928-30. A reason for the circumvention of the statutory re-
quirements is the necessity of proponents to obtain the statutorily designated number of signatures
and additional signatures to compensate for those that might be invalidated. Because of the ne-
cessity of gathering the large number of signatures, a signature-gathering industry has developed.
Since compensation for the signature-gathering industry has now become dependent upon the
number of signatures gathered, the motivation to use illegal devices has increased. Id. See gener-
ally CAL. ELEC. CODE §§41, 42,44, 53, 3516, 3517, 3519 (examples of some of the statutory proce-
dures mentioned earlier).
81. Note, supra note I, at 928-29.
82. Id. at 934-39.
83. E.g., Proposition 8.
84. Note, supra note I, at 935-39. To prevent the influence of large campaign contributions
on elections the Political Reform Act of 1974 requires proponents to file campaign statements with
the Secretary of State listing committees supporting or opposing the initiative and indicating the
amounts spent on the campaign by these committees. CAL. GOVT. CODE §§82013, 84200, 84300.
See generally Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public
Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 505, 513 (1982).
Parts II and III demonstrate that one-sided spending is routinely effective when it is on
the negative side and that since decisive one-sided spending characteristically has relied
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voter misunderstanding was pointed out by Chief Justice Bird in her
dissent in Brosnahan:
... the initiative process renders it difficult for the individual voter
to become fully informed about any particular proposal. 'Voters
have neither the time nor the resources to mount an in depth investi-
gation of a proposed initiative.' 'The majority of qualified electors
are so much interested in managing their own affairs that they have
no time carefully to consider measures affecting the general public.'8 5
This lack of voter understanding may cause voters to vote contrary to
their true intentions regarding the subject of the initiative. Further-
more, voter misunderstanding and the absence of review of initiative
measures permits the manipulation of the election and may result in
the passage of legislation that benefits only a few.86 These two charac-
teristics of the initiative process, therefore, distinguish the initiative
process from the legislative process. Since the two processes are differ-
ent, the "reasonably germane" standard should not be applied to both.
In addition to these characteristics in the initiative process, the lack of
early judicial review provides another reason to change the current ap-
plication of the single-subject rule.
B. Judicial Review of Initiatives
At present, the California Supreme Court will rarely hear a chal-
lenge to an initiative under the rule prior to elections.8 7 Only when
there is a clear showing of conffict with the rule will the court hear the
case before on election.88 This general refusal of the court to hear pre-
election challenges under the rule has resulted in an expostfacto use of
the rule. This use of the rule causes several problems.
Primarily, the expostfacto use of the rule reduces the deterrent effect
of the rule. Specifically, when the initiative is approved by the voters, it
wears the cloak of validity. Rather than taking a neutral stand in de-
termining whether the legislation violates the single-subject rule, the
court takes the position that the voters understood the initiative and
that the legislation is valid under the rule. 9 The deterrent effect of the
rule, therefore, is decreased because proponents realize that their pro-
on deceit and distortion, there is reason to believe that such spending often causes results
that are contrary to the will of the voters.
Id.
85. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d at 266, 651 P.2d at 292, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
86. See Note, supra note 1, at 933-34.
87. See Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 4, 641 P.2d 200, 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 101 (1982).
88. Id.
89. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d at 252, 651 P.2d at 283-84, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40
(quoting from Amador Valley v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 239).
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posal is not likely to be challenged before the proposal carries the pre-
sumption of validity under the rule. As a result, proponents may be
encouraged, rather than discouraged, to draft complex legislation in the
hope of confusing the voters and gaining voter approval of the
proposal.90
Therefore, the failure of the court to entertain challenges to initia-
tives under the rule prior to elections along with the characteristics of
the initiative process, increases the likelihood that multisubject initia-
tives will be enacted into law.9' A recent example of how the dangers
of a multisubject initiative may subvert the will of the people is Propo-
sition 8.
One of the subjects of Proposition 8 was bail reform.92 On the same
ballot as Proposition 8 was Proposition 4 which restated exactly the bail
reform provision found in Proposition 8.93 Proposition 4 passed with
82 percent of the electorate votes while Proposition 8 received only 56
percent of the votes cast.94 This disparity in votes indicates that over 25
percefit of the voters favored bail reform but that they nevertheless
voted against Proposition 8 because they opposed other provisions in-
cluded in the measure.95 Therefore, since 25 percent of the voters re-
jected other parts of Proposition 8 but favored the bail reform
provision, that 25 percent of the electorate were denied the right to
evaluate independently each proposal of an initiative.96
Furthermore, Proposition 8 illustrates the danger of voter misunder-
standing. The multifarious nature of Proposition 8 prevented voters, as
well as the authors of the bill, from understanding the true impact of
the proposed legislation. Specifically, the general intent behind Propo-
90. Moreover, the post election judicial review of challenges to initiatives under the rule is
directly contrary to the wording of the single-subject rule in the California Constitution. The
California Constitution prohibits an initiative containing more than one subject from being sub-
mitted to the voters. See CAL. CONsT. art. II, §8(d). From the language of the constitution, there-
fore, it may be inferred that proponents may not submit a draft which contains more than one
subject to the Attorney General for an official title and summary. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §3502.
The court, however, has clearly applied the rule contrary to this constitutional provision.
The court has justified its postelection review of initiatives challenged under the rule based on
the principle that unless it is clear that a proposed initiative is unconstitutional, the courts should
not interfere with the right of the people to vote on the measure. But this principle applies only if
the initiative is unconstitutional because of its substance. If the court determines that the electo-
rate does not possess the power to adopt the proposal in the first instance, then the measure may
not be placed on the ballot. See Brosnahan v. Eu, 25 Cal. 3d at 6, 641 P.2d at 202, 181 Cal. Rptr.
at 102.
91. The danger ofimultisubject initiatives is the possibility that the voters may misunderstand
the proposal or that the proposal may gain passage due to the aggregation of votes by minority
interests.
92. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d at 278-79, 651 P.2d at 299-300, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 55-
56.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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sition 8 was to deter crime by changing criminal laws and procedures
so that there would be more criminal convictions and sentencing to
state prisons.97 The complexity of Proposition 8, however, has frus-
trated the intent of the measure. For example, attorneys for accused
rapists, robbers, and attempted murderers report that their clients have
actually benefitted under the new law.98 Furthermore, judges and
prosecutors in several of the largest counties in California report that
Proposition 8 has not increased measurably the conviction rate or the
average length of sentences. 99 Moreover, it is unlikely that the voters
understood that Proposition 8 also would result in granting defendants
the right to question alleged rape victims about their sexual activity
prior to the alleged rape,"°° authorizing witnesses to testify to matters
about which they have no personal knowledge, 10 1 or authorizing the
trial court to exclude certain relevant evidence.10 2
Despite these dangers of the multisubject nature of Proposition 8, the
majority of the court upheld the legality of Proposition 8 under a single
subject attack. Although Proposition 8 is the only recent example of
how multisubject initiatives may result in subverting the will of the vot-
ers, the danger still exists that other multifarious initiatives might be-
come law. This danger exists because the court has failed to recognize
that the "reasonably germane" standard is not appropriate to deter-
mine whether initiatives violate the single-subject rule. 0 3 Therefore,
this comment recommends that the court adopt a standard that will
require the court to give closer review to multisubject initiatives.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The California Supreme Court should replace the "reasonably ger-
mane" standard with a stricter standard of review."° The standard
97. Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 7, col. 2.
101. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d at 278, 651 P.2d at 300, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
102. Id. at 279, 651 P.2d at 300, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
103. In particular, the standard is inappropriate because the initiative process fails to provide
the opportunity for the voters to review initiatives and to understand the true impact of complex
proposals. Moreover, the "reasonably germane" standard requires that the court presume that an
initiative does not violate the rule.
104. The court in Brosnahan v. Brown refused to adopt a more stringent standard of review as
suggested by the dissent. Instead, the court continued to follow the earlier cases under the rule
that the single-subject rule was not intended to strike down legitimate legislation. Consistent with
this view, the court also assumed that voters who approve a constitutional amendment have voted
intelligently and have fully considered the entire amendment. Thus, the court ignored the
problems of the initiative process discussed by the dissent. See Brosnahan v. Broivn, 32 Cal. 3d at
245-53, 651 P.2d at 279-84, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 35-40. One reason for a stricter standard of review is
to prevent multisubject initiatives containing provisions that are not favored by a majority of the
voters. Moreover, the presumption of validity given to initiatives under the "reasonably germane"
1107
Pacdfic Law Journal / Vol. 14
that the California Supreme Court should adopt is one that was ex-
pressed inAmador Valley v. State Brd of Equalization.0 5 The court in
Amador Valley noted that the provisions of the challenged proposal
were not only "reasonably germane," but also were interrelated and
interdependent and necessary to form an interlocking package. 0 6 The
essential element of this standard is the interlocking relationship be-
tween the provisions of a proposal. This standard will not allow an
initiative to stand under the rule unless all of the provisions of the initi-
ative are interdependent, so the court will be required to examine more
carefully how the challenged legislation will operate in practice. Spe-
cifically, the court will be forced to consider the initiative in hypotheti-
cal situations to determine whether each provision depends sufficiently
on others to meet the intended objectives of the proposal.
In addition to a stricter standard, the court should entertain pre-elec-
tion challenges to initiatives under the rule. This does not mean, how-
ever, that the court must give full consideration to every pre-election
challenge. In fact, the court should use its discretion to avoid lengthy
trials that could prevent challenged initiatives from ever being
presented to the voters.
This early judicial review, along with the proposed stricter standard,
will require the court to invalidate multifarious initiatives. The court
will no longer be able to presume that the challenged initiative con-
forms with the single-subject rule and the initiative will not be shielded
from the rule by voter sanction. This early judicial review coupled
with the stricter standard will further prevent the enactment of multifa-
rious initiatives by increasing the deterrent effect of the rule.
In response, initiative proponents will be forced to draft proposals
that are narrower in scope. For example, had Proposition 8 been re-
viewed under the proposed stricter standard, its proponents would have
had to modify the initiative significantly. Specifically, the stated pur-
pose of Proposition 8 was to promote the rights of actual or potential
standard may encourage proponents to draft complex and confusing measures that may not be
favored by a majority of the voters. Therefore, the court should give a closer review to initiatives
challenged under the rule.
105. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 231, 583 P.2d 1281, 1290-91, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 248-49 (1978).
106. See id. at 231, 583 P.2d at 1290, 149 Cal. Rptr. 248. The initiative challenged inAmador
was the Proposition 13 property tax initiative. Proposition 13 consisted of four major elements
designed to effect a real property tax rate decrease. The elements were: (1) a real property tax rate
limitation; (2) a real property assessment limitation; (3) a restriction on state taxes; and (4) a
restriction on local taxes. Since real property tax is a function of both rate and assessment, sec-
tions one and two are necessary to assure that both variables in the property tax formula are
subject to control. Also, since any tax savings resulting from sections one and two could be with-
drawn or depleted by additional state or local property taxes, sections three and four are necessary
to restrict the imposition of additional taxes. Thus, each section is dependent upon the other to
effect the goal of property tax relief. Id.
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crime victims. 0 7 This purpose was to be accomplished by providing
restitution to crime victims, providing citizens with the right to safe
schools, changing the right to bail, changing the use of prior convic-
tions for impeachment or sentence enhancement, and changing court
procedures in criminal cases.' Applying the proposed standard to the
various sections, however, reveals that the sections do not depend on
one another. In particular, only two aspects of the initiative relate di-
rectly to crime victims-those provisions dealing with restitution and
victims' statements at sentencing and parole hearings. 09 The numer-
ous other provisions of the initiative revising criminal procedures have
only an incidental effect on the victims of crime."' Similarly, provid-
ing restitution to crime victims is not dependent upon having safe
schools in order to promote the rights of crime victims. In fact, Propo-
sition 8 grants to students and staff the right to protection from not only
criminal violence but also from every danger that might threaten their
safety."' Furthermore, even if the right to safe schools was limited to
protection from criminal violence, the right to restitution would not
prevent criminal violence in schools.
This lack of interdependency among the provisions in Proposition 8
illustrates the inadequacy of the "reasonably germane" standard. For
example, in order for the court to find that all of the provisions of Prop-
osition 8 encompassed one subject, the court expanded the subject of
Proposition 8 to include "potential crime victims.""I2 "Potential crime
victims" could include virtually every aspect of our lives. Therefore,
"the single-subject rule would be rendered meaningless if it could be
complied with simply by devising some general concept expansive
enough to encompass all of an initiative's provisions.""I3 By applying
the proposed standard, however, multisubject initiatives similar to
Proposition 8 would not become law.
In addition to the foregoing, early judicial review also will deter mul-
tifarious initiatives from becoming law. By allowing an initiative to be
challenged under the rule prior to elections, the initiative may be found
to violate the rule, thus eliminating the presumption of validity given to
an initiative by the court after the initiative has been approved by the
107. See Cal. Voter Pamphlet, supra note 48, at 32.
108. Id.
109. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d at 271, 651 P.2d at 295, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 51 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 272, 651 P.2d at 296, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 52 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 273, 651 P.2d at 296, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 52 (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
113. Id.
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voters. Without the presumption of validity, proponents will be de-
terred from presenting to the voters initiative proposals that contain
multiple and unrelated provisions each favored by only a few voters
but when combined could carry a majority. Another benefit of early
judicial review is that proponents may be able to amend the proposal in
conformance with the rule in time to present the proposal to the voters.
This early judicial review and stricter standard is superior to the cur-
rent application of the rule used by the court because the former will
protect more effectively the will of the people without impairing their
right to enact legislation by initiative. The proposed standard will in-
validate initiatives with multiple provisions that barely relate to the
purpose of the initiative. Moreover, since the rule is limited to those
initiatives with multiple provisions, people are still free to present to
the voters an unlimited number of initiatives that contain single
provisions.
CONCLUSION
The current application of the single-subject rule to initiatives by the
California Supreme Court frustrates the purpose of the rule. More-
over, the court does not clearly define the meaning of a single-subject.
In order, therefore, to ensure that the purposes of the rule are followed,
the court should adopt a new application of the rule.
Originally, the single-subject rule was enacted to curb the abuses of
"logrolling" and "riders" in the legislature. Subsequently, the rule was
extended to prevent multisubject initiatives that might mislead voters
or that might rely upon the aggregation of minority interest to obtain
passage. Once initiatives were subject to challenges under the rule, the
California Supreme Court was faced with the task of choosing a stan-
dard to determine what constituted a single subject. The court chose
the established "reasonably germane" standard that had been applied
to statutes passed in the Legislature. If the initiative and the legislative
process, however, are not substantially the same then logically the court
should not apply the same "reasonably germane" standard to both
processes. The lack of proposal review and the possibility of voter mis-
understanding of initiatives, in fact, clearly distinguish the legislative
and initiative processes. These characteristics of the initiative process
and the lack of early judicial review of initiatives challenged under the
rule prior to elections increase the likelihood that multifarious initia-
tives will become law. Using the "reasonably germane" standard of
review for initiatives, the court has upheld initiatives encompassing
very broad subjects. By upholding initiatives with broad subjects, the
potential exists that "initiatives could embrace hundreds of uncon-
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nected statutes, countless rules of court and volumes of judicial deci-
sions, as well as completely alter the complex interrelationships of our
society.""I4 The "reasonably germane" standard, therefore, is not the
appropriate standard to determine whether initiatives violate the sin-
gle-subject rule.
Consequently, the court should adopt a new standard to protect the
will of the people. The standard proposed by this comment would re-
quire that multiple provisions within an initiative be interdependent
and accomplish the purpose of the initiative. In addition, the proposed
standard would require the court to hear challenges to initiatives prior
to elections. This stricter standard and early judicial review would in-
crease the deterrent effect of the rule without impeding the ability of
the voters to enact legislation by initiative. Specifically, the standard
would deter multifarious legislation because the standard would force
the court to strike down legislation with broad purposes and containing
provisions that are only remotely related to the purpose of the initia-
tive. In turn, proponents would be discouraged from drafting multifa-
rious legislation containing provisions that are unfavorable to the
majority of voters. Thus, rather than stifle the voice of the people, the
proposed standard will make that voice more clearly heard.
Steven W Ray
114. Id.
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